









































The reaction of asset markets to Swiss National Bank 
communication 
Angelo Ranaldo and Enzo RossiThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of the Swiss National Bank. Working Papers describe research in progress.
Their aim is to elicit comments and to further debate.
ISSN 1660-7716
© 2007 by Swiss National Bank, Börsenstrasse 15, P.O. Box, CH-8022 Zurich  1

















In this paper we analyze high-frequency movements in Swiss financial markets in reaction 
to real-time communication by the Swiss National Bank. Our analysis of central bank 
communication encompasses official speeches and interviews, not only monetary policy 
announcements. We examine the reactions of the currency market, the bond market and the 
stock exchange. The evidence suggests that speeches and interviews, along with monetary 
policy announcements, engender a significant price reaction. This paper sheds light on the 
relevance of communications other than monetary policy announcements. 
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Introduction 
Communication by central banks has attracted considerable attention in the last few years. 
It is seen as instrumental in achieving transparency and a high degree of accountability. 
Moreover, by communicating their intentions, central banks affect the expectations of 
financial market participants and financial assets and thus increase the effectiveness of 
monetary policy (Blinder, 1998; Woodford, 2003; Bernanke, 2004). Ideally, monetary policy 
is able to respond less aggressively than would otherwise have been necessary. 
Despite its relevance, relatively little research has been done into the effects of central 
bank communication. This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing whether 
communication by Swiss National Bank (SNB) management affects Swiss asset markets using 
high-frequency data. The paper goes beyond previous studies in three important respects. 
First, it not only investigates the reactions of asset markets to official policy 
announcements but also to speeches and interviews. Second, it analyzes the reaction of 
three financial assets: currency rates, stocks and bonds. Third, it provides a new database 
derived from internal SNB information and external newswire reports. 
The paper’s findings are that SNB communication does indeed affect asset markets. They 
react not only to official policy statements but also to speeches and interviews. Market 
participants actively monitor and promptly respond to central bank communication. While 
official policy announcements cannot be used in a discretionary way, speeches and 
interviews allow the monetary authorities to flexibly inform market participants about past 
and ongoing economic activity as well as about impending policy. The policy conclusions of 
this paper are that communication tools may be seen as additional policy instruments 
which, however, have to be handled with circumspection.  
This paper’s conclusion is partially at odds with Reeves and Sawicki (2005) who found that 
in the UK, speeches and testimony to parliamentary committees are less informative than 
the Bank of England’s Minutes and Inflation Report. The Swiss case also contrasts with Kohn 
and Sack (2004) who found a significant response in interest rate expectations to the 
Federal Open Market Committee and to Chairman Greenspan’s testimony to Congress, but no 
reaction to ordinary speeches - the most comparable form of communication across 
countries. 
After reviewing the existing literature and related research, this paper describes the SNB’s 
monetary policy concept and its communication instruments. Next, it presents the empirical 
framework used to estimate the short-term effects of communication on selected Swiss asset   3
prices, followed by a description of the data. Then, the results are shown. The final section 
presents conclusions.  
 
1. Literature survey 
The burgeoning body of literature on central bank communication and transparency can be 
parsed into different categories. On the one hand there is a good deal of theoretical work 
covering the welfare implications associated with central bank transparency. No consensus 
on whether higher central bank transparency is generally beneficial has emerged (yet).
1 On 
the other, a fast expanding empirical literature hints at overall positive effects of 
transparency. The empirical research has tackled the issue from different angles.  
One broad research area emphasizes the macroeconomic implications of varying degrees of 
central bank transparency and communication. For instance, Chortareas et al. (2002) 
document a decrease in inflation following increased central bank transparency in a large 
country-sample. Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2005) found that the sensitivity of private 
sector inflation expectations to past inflation has diminished against the backdrop of 
greater transparency. Geraats et al. (2006) report an increase in policy flexibility and a 
decrease in inflation expectations. A related group of empirical contributions encompasses 
studies focusing on communication strategies (Blinder et al., 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2005a; Blinder, 2006a).  
Another investigative approach concentrates on the effects of macroeconomic news releases 
or, more specifically, of central bank communication on financial markets. One research 
issue is whether there is a link between transparency and monetary policy predictability. The 
evidence for transparency increasing monetary policy predictability seems compelling. See, 
among others, Gerlach-Kristen (2004), Kohn and Sack (2004), Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004; 2005b, 2005c), Wilhelmsen and Zaghini (2005), and Swanson (2006).  
A further line of research, and the one adopted in this paper, focuses on the role of 
macroeconomic and public news announcements as a source of financial market reactions. 
The vast literature on macro announcements offers ample evidence that macroeconomic 
news affect asset prices. The contributions can be broadly categorized according to the 
market researched. One focal point of literature linking macroeconomic news and the 
variation of securities prices is the foreign exchange market. A selection of papers includes 
Andersen et al. (2003), Fratzscher (2004), and Jansen and de Haan (2005). Another focus 
of research is bond market reactions, researched, for instance, by Cook and Hahn (1989), 
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Balduzzi et al. (2001), Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005a) and Gürkaynak et al. (2005).
 
The third focal point has been the stock market, whose reactions have been scrutinized by, 
among others, Bomfim (2003), Poitras (2004), and Zebedee et al. (2005). Some studies 
examine announcement effects on more than one financial market, as, for instance, 
Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995), Clare and Courtenay (2000, 2001), Fair (2003), Faust et 
al. (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2006).
2  
A particular line of research on macroeconomic news and financial assets, to which our 
paper contributes, focuses on information emanating from central banks. For instance, Bell 
and Windle (2005) and Reeves and Sawicki (2005) looked into the reaction of sterling 
interest rates to Bank of England communication. Jansen and De Haan (2005) studied the 
reaction of euro-dollar exchange rates to statements by the European Central Bank and 
national central bank officials. Kohn and Sack (2004) investigated the response of various 
U.S. financial variables to FOMC statements accompanying interest rate decisions and to 
former chairman Greenspan’s testimony to Congress. Bomfim (2003) studied the influence of 
FED announcements on the U.S. stock market. 
 
2. SNB’s monetary policy concept and communication tools 
The SNB’s monetary policy concept, which grew out of 25 years of monetary targeting, 
consists of three elements. The first element is a definition of what the SNB considers 
compatible with price stability - a rise in the CPI of less than 2% per annum that acts as a 
nominal anchor. The second element is an inflation forecast issued quarterly following a 
monetary policy assessment.
3 Monetary policy assessments are held in mid-March, mid-June, 
mid-September and mid-December (“scheduled decisions”). However, until the end of 2002 
the inflation forecasts, although computed quarterly, were made public only semi-annually. 
The third element is a published operational target range for the three-month Libor as a 
reference interest rate. Normally, this range has a width of 100 basis points. Additionally, 
the SNB announces where in this band it wishes the Libor to remain.
4 Typically, this reflects 
the midpoint of the announced target range. As a rule, the target range is reviewed by the 
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especially the overnight and the one-week rate. Through arbitrage and expectations the three-month Libor is 
quite closely linked to very short-term rates.   5
Governing Board at the quarterly monetary policy assessment. If necessary, the Board may 
change the target range at short notice between regular meetings, giving rise to what we 
term “unscheduled decisions”. 
Although the SNB has a decades-long history of regular explanation of its monetary policy 
decisions to market participants and the public, it has steadily refined its communication 
policies and substantially increased its transparency.
5 In order to communicate its current 
assessment of economic developments and its thinking about future policy decisions, 
today’s SNB resorts to a broad set of communication tools. First and foremost, a detailed 
press release - comprising i) assumptions for the global economy, ii) a comprehensive 
appraisal of domestic economic activity and its outlook, iii) an evaluation of monetary 
developments, iv) inflation perspectives based on ii) and iii) and the explanation of the 
monetary policy decision, v) the target range for the Libor and the envisaged interest rate 
within this band and vi) an inflation forecast based on the assumption that the new 
decided Libor will remain constant over the forecasting period of three years - is made 
available immediately after the quarterly monetary policy assessment. Great emphasis is laid 
upon the reasoning behind each decision, which is explained irrespective of whether policy 
settings have been changed or not. In the June and December assessments this information 
is delivered at a press conference.  
A few weeks later, the SNB publishes a Monetary Policy Report. In it, the SNB issues 
statements on the development of the principal indicators that were taken into account, 
describes the latest monetary and economic developments, conveys its views on the 
economic situation and explains the inflation forecast more thoroughly. Moreover, the SNB 
submits an annual accountability report to the Federal Assembly in which it explains in 
detail how it has fulfilled its statutory mandate, in particular the conduct of monetary 
policy, and also describes the economic and monetary developments in the year under 
review. In addition, the Chairman of the Governing Board testifies before parliamentary 
commissions. Further means of communication include speeches and interviews delivered by 
the Governing Board and other senior officials in which supplementary information on Swiss 
monetary policy is offered. In this paper we will analyze the market impact of monetary 
policy decisions, speeches and interviews. 
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3. Estimation procedure  
3.1 Non-parametric event study 
Event studies can in principle be carried out by means of parametric or non-parametric 
methods. Parametric event studies make specific assumptions regarding market models and 
distribution of excess returns. Ever since Cook and Hahn’s early (1989) paper assessing 
markets’ reaction to monetary policy actions embedded in a parametric event study, 
numerous researchers have adopted and refined this approach. Critical in these studies is 
the correct measurement of policy surprises. A variety of different techniques and financial 
instruments have been employed to model the surprise component of an announcement.
6 
We have opted for a non-parametric analysis, which has several advantages. By choosing a 
non-parametric procedure, we can overcome the difficulties of replicating the surprise of 
monetary policy communication. Second, non-parametric event study approaches are free of 
specific assumptions regarding return distribution and price formation behaviour in the 
market in question. Third, a key advantage of our event study approach is that it avoids 
having to classify communication. Unlike much of the literature, we can thus circumvent 
the danger of misclassifying statements and their intended content. Fourth, this approach 
allows us to analyze communication impacts event by event. We estimate the statistical 
significance of price impacts surrounding communication events by means of t-statistics. 
We refer to two-tail statistics for the inequality between the price changes related to a 
specific event and the mean overall returns (inequality hypothesis). Note that we perform 
the two-sample equal variance (homoscedastic) test. This represents a more stringent test 
than the heteroscedastic hypothesis. Also, we calculate the mean overall return of the 
statistical population rather than the return during non-communication periods only. Both 
aspects give the probability associated with a Student's t-test for equality in means an 
upward bias and lead to a more likely rejection of the inequality hypothesis. The standard 
errors for the t-test are based on the population’s standard deviation. We also considered a 
more contingent and time-variable definition of standard deviation. For instance, we have 
considered the return standard deviation at the same time of day as each specific event 
occurred. This allows us to take into account some effects due to intraday seasonalities. We 
have also conditioned return variability on the recent past by considering the last 8, 26 or 
52 weeks. Our findings remain essentially unchanged.  
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mismeasurement of the macroeconomic news so that the measured data surprises explain only a small portion 
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We also attempt to analyze the statistical impact related to a specific communication tool. 
To this end, we employ non-parametric measures comparing the price impacts related to a 
given communication instrument and the overall price changes. Specifically, we examine 
whether the mean, median and variance of intraday returns clustered around communication 
events are likely to be equal to those of the population. The non-parametric tests shown in 
the tables are the Anova F-test, the Median Chi-square test and the Variance F-test. Other 
methodologies for the mean, median and variance test have been considered.
7 These 
additional measures – not reported in the paper – are supportive of its results. 
To ease the reading of our results, we organised the tables as follows. First, we present the 
reaction asset by asset, starting with the forex, followed by equities and finally bonds. 
Second, each table exhibits significant event-specific and communication-specific results. 
Accordingly, we report intraday price impacts on an event-by-event basis (size of price 
impact and related t-test), followed by the overall impact of each communication tool 
measured by the Anova F-test, the Median Chi-square and the Variance F-test. Third, for 
each market we looked at the three communication events in the following order: monetary 
policy announcements, official speeches, and interviews. We began by investigating 
scheduled and unscheduled policy announcements separately. In so doing, we calculated 
statistical tests comprising all monetary policy announcements, a subsample including only 
the scheduled events, i.e. scheduled monetary policy announcements and Ordinary General 
Meetings of Shareholders and bank authorities, and finally scheduled monetary policy 
assessments only. This allowed us to infer whether the market reacted to both scheduled 
and unscheduled monetary policy announcements. Finally, we considered interviews and 
speeches reported either during working hours or out of business hours or for which it was 
not possible to establish the exact intraday time. To opportunely report these information 
releases, we organized the tables on speeches and interviews into two panels. As explained 
below in more detail, the upper panel shows the intraday effect within trading hours. The 
lower panel illustrates the daily effect of off-market news. 
Although knowledge of whether the market response corresponded with policymakers’ 
intentions would constitute an (additional) important insight from a policymaking point of 
view, our analysis is limited to the description of the market reactions. We refrained from 
any normative interpretation of the results.   
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considered additional variance tests such as Singel-Tukey, Barlett and Levene methods.   8
3.2 Sampling interval  
While earlier papers on asset price movements used monthly or even quarterly data, event 
study literature employs daily data. However, even this seems insufficient. First, earlier work 
has shown that the average effect of announcements is felt very quickly.
8 The use of daily 
data, including the effect of announcements and all other information impacting the market 
that day, leads to very imprecise estimates of the announcements’ effects, especially on 
highly variable asset prices, such as foreign exchange. For instance, attempts to identify 
systematic relationships between the surprise component of macroeconomic data releases 
and one-day exchange rate changes have not been successful, as shown by Hardouvelis 
(1988) and Edison (1997).  
To mitigate these problems, higher-frequency data which shrinks the time period around the 
policy decisions has been used in more recent work. High-frequency, intraday data exhibits 
two appealing characteristics: First, by narrowing time windows around a specific event, it 
becomes much less likely that any other cause can mistakenly be identified as having 
determined market reactions. Second, estimations are more efficient in terms of 
identification and evaluation of single outliers. 
Thanks to data availability, the more recent contributions to the literature make use of 
intradaily data.
9 Thus, in order to characterise the response of asset markets more 
accurately, we also use intraday data coupled with the exact time of an SNB announcement. 
While most of the previous literature on intraday event study confines the analysis to a 
short period of time, we also compare the reaction of financial markets over different event 
windows varying according to the form of communication. The shortest time window we 
allow for is 5 minutes, the longest includes a 24-hour window following the arrival of 
information from monetary policymakers, excluding overnight movements.  
 
3.3 Sample period  
Another feature of previous research into asset price movements over short windows of time 
around announcements is its customary restriction to a short sample period for lack of 
intradaily data over long spans.
10 We agree with Faust et al. (2003) that using a long time 
                                                           
8 Balduzzi et al. (2001) describe this phenomenon for the bond markets and Andersen et al. (2003) for the 
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9 Moving from daily to intradaily frequency may affect the outcomes significantly. For instance, Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2005b) obtain a tripling of R
2 in a regression of US equity prices on the surprise 
component of the change in the federal funds rate target by switching from a daily to intradaily windows. 
10 Exceptions are Fair (2003), Faust et al. (2003) and Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005b).   9
span is appealing, and stress the benefits of high-frequency data. A longer series of high 
frequency data contributes to the precision of estimates and allows for the exploration of 
the possibility that the effects of announcements on asset prices may vary over time. We 
focus our attention on the period beginning with the implementation of the SNB’s new 
monetary policy framework, thus including information from January 2000 to December 
2005. While the market impact of communication under two different monetary policy 
regimes would constitute an interesting line of research, lack of sufficient observations 
during the monetary targeting time frame creates an insurmountable barrier to empirical 
examination. Hence, given that monetary policy decisions are taken quarterly, our sample of 
policy announcements is relatively short. It does nonetheless incorporate a period featuring 
interest rate increases, a period with historically low interest rates, a bull and bear equity 
market and a series of significant shocks to the economy, including the impact of 9/11 and 
a sharp rise in oil prices. 
 
3.4 Methodological limits 
There are at least four methodological limits to point out. First, the accuracy of the results 
depends significantly on the extent of broadcasting systems information taken into account 
and the precision with which their reports are captured. Given that it is impossible to track 
all broadcasting systems, one methodological limit to our analysis is that it is restricted to 
three leading newswire companies: Dow Jones Newswires, Reuters and Bloomberg. However, 
there are many others which may report on communication events by the SNB, such as AWP 
(AG für Wirtschafts-Publikationen), SDA (Schweizerische Depeschenagentur AG), etc.  
A second limit refers to the precision with which the event time can be time-stamped. 
Several issues come into play here. While the actual time of a monetary policy 
announcement can be precisely identified, there may be a mismatch between a speech or 
interview and the time of a related news release. On the one hand, a speech may be given 
ahead of the official time, followed by a waiting period (also called "embargo"). Thus, 
information may become publicly available before the official embargo elapses. As a result 
of these methodological constraints we may find market movements ahead of the reporting 
time of news broadcasts tracked in this study. When it comes to interviews, it is possible 
that SNB-related information circulates among market participants prior to newswire 
reporting. The reason is that unlike speeches, the dates of interviews are not always 
publicly available in advance. Occasionally, broadcasting companies call up the SNB’s press 
office to check the content of an interview before reporting on it. Information may 
therefore already be in circulation when the first newswire appears. Early market   10
fluctuations (prior to the first newswire release) are thus possible. A related limit is linked 
to the intraday time windows, set to 5 minutes. This 5 minute rule means that all events 
must be rounded up or down to the nearest 5-minute time interval, even if an event was 
reported in between.
11  
Third, even if we observe significant price movements surrounding SNB communications, we 
cannot exclude that these are due to other causes. We distinguish two possible biases. First, 
although the intraday analysis enhances the measurement precision of the event impact, 
many other occurrences that we did not control for can significantly affect asset prices. For 
example, it is difficult to infer whether speeches and interviews reported in the wake of 
9/11 had a genuine market impact. To account for this possible bias, we also report price 
movements the day before and after the SNB communication event. Second, there may be 
overlapping SNB communication events that have to be taken into account. If overlapping 
communication events occurred, we reported them in footnotes to each table. Some of them 
explain apparent early price movements. 
Fourth, by using high-frequency data we attempted to nail down the effects of SNB 
communication on financial markets distinct from other news. We grouped the intraday data 
within successive time windows, thus extending the observation period. Given that we did 
not focus exclusively on market behaviour narrowly confined around communication events, 
we cannot exclude that the genuine market reaction to SNB communication is being offset 
by other news, producing a price reversal. Therefore, we cannot rule out that other 
incoming news may make a significant communication event ineffective over a longer time-
frame.  
 
4. Data and summary statistics 
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis. We study the impact of SNB 
communication using high-frequency intraday data on the CHF/USD, the Swiss Bond Index 
(SBI) and, as the measure of the stock exchange, the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). 
Observations run from January 2000 to December 2005. As pointed out above, the 
beginning of the sample is dictated by the onset of the new monetary policy concept 
adopted by the SNB. Data on the CHF/USD rate was kindly provided to us by the Swiss-
Systematic Asset Management SA, Zurich. The data on both the SBI and SPI were placed at 
our disposal by the SWX Swiss Exchange.
12 Furthermore, we use daily data, obtained from 
                                                           
11 For instance, if a newswire report occurs at 1.58 pm it is rounded up to 2 o’clock. If, however, a report is 
clocked up at 1.57 p.m. it is rounded down to 1.55.  
12 We thank Richard Meier and Marc Berthoud (both at SWX) for their collaboration and assistance.    11
Datastream, measured at one p.m. GMT time. In order to capture the surprise elements of 
communication we relied on the movements of the Futures written on the three-month 
Libor in a 20-minute window following an SNB announcement. These data are from the 
SNB.
13 
The data contain information on transaction prices and the related time stamp to the 
nearest second of all index changes or representative forex quotes that occurred in our 
sample period. The data set has been organised into 5-minute time intervals. If no trades 
occurred in a given 5-minute interval, we copied down the price from the previous time 
interval. We carefully checked the presence of outliers and all other data properties. Indeed, 
we encountered irregular records for the SBI from 28/11/2002 to 7/11/2003. The SWX 
confirmed that this was due to a calculation problem in bond coupon values. For that 
reason, we excluded this period from the bond analysis.
14 
As described in Section 2, the SNB engages in intensive communication activities. We focus 
on three forms: speeches as well as interviews (both by members of the Enlarged Governing 
Board) and monetary policy announcements by the Governing Board, both scheduled and 
unscheduled. Incidentally, these communication forms exhibit a methodological advantage 
as their dates are – apart from the few unscheduled assessments – published well in 
advance, so that no endogeneity problem found in the literature on central bank 
communication blurs our results.
15 
For the sake of completeness and extension of observations in the sample we added the 
remarks of the Chairman of the Board made during the Ordinary General Meeting. The 
General Meeting is held once a year, as a rule in April.
16 The communication sample had to 
be constructed from scratch. To this end, we first fell back on an unpublished daily report 
drawn up by the SNB’s press office that provides coverage of highlights reported by the 
media. From these publications we selected all articles referring to SNB speeches, interviews 
and monetary policy decisions. Once our sample of speeches was constructed, we compared 
it with the SNB’s in-house statistics. By contrast, our sample of interviews contains only 
those covered by the media. Speeches and interviews were included irrespective of their 
content. If we simultaneously came across newswire reports alluding to SNB spokesmen 
                                                           
13 We are grateful to Marcel Zimmermann (SNB). 
14 Unfortunately, all other relevant indices on Swiss bonds provided by the SWX are also affected by this 
problem. Moreover, SWX does not plan to recalculate these intraday data. Therefore, it is impossible to find a 
better alternative to the total bond index. 
15 Our database also contains communications by SNB spokesmen in which an endogeneity problem may arise, 
as spokesmen interventions may occur in reaction to particular market conditions. However, spokesmen 
communication represents only 16% of interviews – too few to affect the results significantly. 
16 Owing to the SNB’s public mandate, the powers of the Shareholders’ Meeting are limited compared with 
joint-stock companies under private law.   12
comments, we added them to our database. The collected information was then used to do a 
search of pertinent references in Bloomberg, Dow Jones and Reuters. For the information 
provided by Dow Jones and Reuters we recurred to Factiva®, from Dow Jones, entering 
several keywords, such as “Swiss National Bank”, “SNB”, “Monetary policy”, the name of 
speaker or interviewee and others. Newswire services’ information is particularly useful since 
they provide a time stamp of the news release to the nearest minute, enabling us to arrange 
precise intraday time windows around the earliest newswire report. The issuance time of the 
monetary policy announcements was provided by the SNB’s press office.
17 Eventually, we 
complemented our data set with reports on the traditional year-end meetings of the 
Chairman of the Board with the cabinet and with information relating to elections and 
resignations of the Enlarged Governing Board members. Although it comprises a good deal 
of information, we did not consider the quarterly Monetary Policy Report for it is not 
available until nearly four weeks (internet) and five weeks (hardcopy) after the latest 
monetary policy assessment.
18 Nor is there any accompanying press conference on its 
publication day.
19 Neither did we take into account the testimonies to the parliamentary 
commissions delivered by the Chairman of the Governing Board. Though an important part 
of the SNB’s accountability, they received no particular media attention.
20 Note also that no 
Minutes of the monetary policy meetings are made publicly available.
21 
Table 1 offers an overview of the three communication forms at issue in this study, 
distinguished by the time of news arrival (Panel A) and by year (Panel B). From the first row 
we can infer that there were 36 monetary policy announcements (i.e. official joint 
communication by the Governing Board), 146 official speeches and 177 interviews. The 
other three rows in Panel A display the three communication forms according to three time 
frames of newswire reporting. The first time frame comprises communication reported on 
during trading hours. The second frame includes reports issued after market closure, i.e. five 
o’clock p.m. The third frame catalogs weekend communication.  
Panel B denotes the time pattern of interviews and speeches. While the number of speeches 
has clearly increased, beginning with 14 in 2000 and reaching a maximum of 36 in 2005, 
                                                           
17 We are deeply indebted to Roland Baumann. 
18 The time lag is largely attributable to the long translation process required for the simultaneous release in 
German, French and English.  
19 In terms of importance the SNB’s Monetary Policy Report is not comparable with, e.g., the Inflation Report 
by the Bank of England’s MPC whose publication is accompanied by an hour-long press conference with three 
senior bank officials.   
20 In any case, only a few data points would be available, for the Chairman of the Governing Board has only 
been required to testify before the parliamentary commission since the enactment of the new National Bank 
Act in May 2004.  
21 Normally, the SNB opens its internal records only after 30 years (Rich, 2003, fn. 6). The rationale for 
abstaining from publishing the Minutes is discussed, e.g., in Jordan and Rossi (2007).    13
the number of interviews per year has, by contrast, diminished of late. It was amplified in 
the first half of the sample, reaching 38 in 2002 and 2003, before dropping to around 20 in 
2004 and 2005. 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Table 2 provides a detailed summary of monetary policy announcements which are parsed 
into scheduled (S) and unscheduled (U) monetary policy decisions on the one hand and 
General Meetings of the SNB’s stockholders and bank authorities (G) on the other. 
Accordingly, six Stockholders’ General Meetings were held while 30 monetary policy 
decisions were announced. Twenty-three resulted from a scheduled meeting while seven 
were made between scheduled meetings. Three distinct policy phases can be distinguished. 
The first phase covers the period from 20 January 2000 to 8 December 2000 and is 
characterised by rising interest rates. The second phase, from 22 March 2001 to 18 March 
2004, is marked by falling and a long period of exceptionally low short-term interest rates. 
The third phase begins in June 2004 and marks the gradual return to a level of short-term 
interest rates commensurate with the historical average.  
Overall, the target range for the three-month Libor or its level was changed fourteen times. 
Half of the interest rate moves were decided on at regularly scheduled policy meetings. The 
size of interest rate steps announced at regular meetings varies from 25 bp to 75 bp. Since 
2004 rate changes have been confined to 25 bp. All rate changes taken at unscheduled 
meetings occurred during the first half of the sample period. Specifically, in the first three 
years following the introduction of the inflation-based monetary policy concept, two 
unscheduled decisions occurred per year, i.e. on 20 January and 3 February 2000, on 17 and 
24 September 2001 and on 2 May and 26 July 2002. The last unscheduled event took place 
on 6 March 2003, dominated by an appreciation of the Swiss franc probably ensuing from 
pervasive fears of deflation and the franc’s role as a safe-haven. Unscheduled decisions have 
one common denominator in that the size of target adaptations amounted to 50 bp. While 
interest rates were increased in the first two unscheduled meetings, they were cut in all 
other instances. More accurately, while the target range was kept unchanged at the first 
decision announced outside the regular calendar, the target for the 3-month Libor was   14
moved from the middle to the upper part of the range. At the second unscheduled decision 
the target range was raised by 50 bp while the target for the Libor was kept unchanged in 
the middle section of the range. The two rate cuts decided at inter-meeting dates in 
September 2001 were called for in the aftermath of 9/11.
22  
From the table we can infer very few policy reversals. Using Blinder’s (2006b) definition 
that a policy reversal is a change in direction within three months, we count only one 
policy reversal. Widening the window to four months adds one more reversal. Not only this 
apparent aversion to policy reversals is in line with other central banks but also the 
preference for gradualism. According to Blinder (2006b, p. 32), the share of rate changes of 
25 bp or less was 79% for the Fed, 88% for the BoE, and 89% for the Riksbank. At the SNB, 
since inception of the new monetary policy concept the share of rate changes of 25 bp or 
less was 73% while the share of rate changes of 50 bp amounted to 23%.
23  
Table 2 also includes the official time of SNB news releases. From it we can take that 
decisions linked to scheduled monetary policy assessments were made public around 9:30 
a.m. (June and December) or around 2 p.m. (March and September). General Meetings 
always started at 10 a.m. Unscheduled decisions were communicated at varying times and, 
with the exception of 17 September 2001, during working hours. The last two columns of 
this table show the extent to which market participants were surprised by the Board’s joint 
communication and the corresponding t-statistics. A positive value of surprise hints at an 
unexpectedly high interest rate decision whereas a negative surprise value represents an 
unexpectedly low interest rate outcome. Overall, positive and negative surprises were more 
or less equal. To measure the market surprises we recurred to the three-month Futures rates 
quoted in the first 20 minutes after the first newswire report.
24  
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5. Market reaction to SNB communication 
Although the event study literature has provided a number of insights about the effects of 
macroeconomic data releases on monetary policy expectations and asset prices, the 
                                                           
22 The first of the two rate cuts was announced three days ahead of the regular assessment in a coordinated 
effort with the FED and the ECB to dampen market uncertainty. 
23 If we consider only the decisions that implied a change in the mid-point target interest rate, then 50% of 
policy moves involved a step of 50 bp; the share of policy moves of 25 bp reduces to 43%.  
24 For lack of data, the surprise component of the first two communications contained in Table 1 was captured 
by the changing of the three-month Libor with respect to the previous day.   15
estimated effects have in general been found to be relatively small. This has been 
demonstrated even for those assets that are reckoned to be very sensitive to near term 
monetary policy expectations. Independent of reaction size, the qualitative findings are 
revealing. One result obtained from high-frequency data is that price adjustments to 
announcements generally occur within one to twenty minutes after the event.  
In this section we examine the impact of different communication tools employed by the 
SNB on three distinct financial markets. In subsection 1 we analyze the response of the 
CHF/USD exchange rate. Subsection 2 looks into the stock exchange and subsection 3 deals 
with the bond market.    
The SNB has long been concerned that it be understood by market participants and the 
public. Clear and honest communication is a prerequisite for transparency. A transparent 
information framework may be achieved by timely and thorough communication and 
explanation of the policy decisions which, as a rule, are taken on a quarterly basis at the 
monetary policy assessments. As follows from Table 1, the SNB has also made extensive use 
of speeches and interviews to promulgate its views between official policy decision 
meetings. Additional tools of communication may improve the regularity and frequency of 
information flow and thus enhance central bank transparency. Based on this reasoning, we 
first investigated whether monetary policy decisions affected financial markets. We then 
analyzed whether financial markets reacted to interviews and speeches. If so, they can be 
seen as conveying additional information to market participants. Used effectively, they can, 
among other things, improve the SNB’s transparency, allowing financial markets to better 
anticipate the monetary policy decisions well in advance of the scheduled day. As a 
corollary, the effect on asset yields may be visible ahead of a monetary policy 
announcement, leaving the markets less affected on the day of a scheduled decision.
25 If, 
conversely, significant reactions occur only at the time of regular and pre-announced 
monetary policy assessments, interviews and speeches would not appear to convey 
significant information regarding monetary policy. 
 
5.1 Effect on exchange rates 
Table 3.1 summarizes the impact of monetary policy decisions (scheduled S or unscheduled 
U) and statements made at the General Meeting of the Stockholders and bank authorities 
                                                           
25 In a similar vein, Haldane and Read (2000) show that a reduction in the markets’ uncertainty about the 
central bank’s reaction function implies that market prices will react less to monetary policy changes since 
market participants are better able to anticipate them, and more fully to news about the state of the 
economy, in particular macroeconomic data releases on which the reaction function is conditioned.   16
(G) on the CHF/USD rate.
26 We constructed six time windows. The first time window 
captures exchange rate movements 15 minutes ahead of an announcement while the second 
window covers the reaction in the 5 minutes immediately following an announcement. The 
third window covers the market’s behaviour from 5 to 15 minutes after a communication 
event. In the remaining three time windows the interval is widened to 15 minutes, i.e. from 
15 to 30 minutes, from 30 to 45 minutes and from 45 to 60 minutes after an 
announcement. Note that in the analysis we can only cover six (of the seven) unscheduled 
monetary policy announcements, because the 50 bp drop in the interest rate target decided 
on 17 September  2001 was made public outside of business hours.  
At least four relevant observations emerge from Table 3.1. First, SNB policy rate decisions 
affected the CHF/USD rate on 10 occasions out of 29 (34%); 6 coincided with scheduled 
meetings and 4 with unscheduled meetings. The bulk occurred in the first part of the 
sample period, with the last significant effect dating back to 17 June 2004, when the target 
band was raised after five quarters of historically low interest rates. Second, remarks during 
the General Meeting never moved the exchange rate significantly. Third, the significance of 
the impact occasionally changed between time windows. For instance, on 3 February 2000, 
the Swiss franc depreciated significantly five minutes after policy communication. In the 
subsequent time window, however, the currency appreciated.
27 In most cases the effect was 
unambiguous. The Swiss franc depreciated six times, and appreciated four times. Fourth, the 
most significant effects were recorded in the first 10 minutes after a policy announcement. 
Hence, exchange rates appear to adjust quickly to news.  
At the bottom of Table 3.1 we present three tests covering the mean, the median and the 
variance of market reactions. They indicate whether an official interest rate announcement 
per se had a significant impact on the forex market. The tests show that monetary policy 
announcements had a strong effect in terms of mean, median and variance of asset prices. 
The results suggest that monetary policy decisions affected the CHF/USD within 15 minutes 
of an announcement, although some effect is still observable after 15 to 30 minutes. As 
shown in the last three rows of Table 3.1, these effects remain strong even after considering 
scheduled announcements only.  
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26 The third column denotes the market surprise depicted in the second to last column of Table 2. 
27 On 22.3.2001 the effect was the other way round. The Swiss franc first appreciated and then depreciated.   17
 
Table 3.2 summarizes all speeches that significantly affected the CHF/USD rate in at least 
one of the time windows included in the table. The first column indicates the day and year 
in which a significant speech was recorded. Entries in columns two to six are based on 
intraday data. The last three columns display the outcomes obtained using daily data. The 
second column shows the market movements 30 minutes before the earliest newswire 
report, followed by the market development in the next 30 minutes, then the interval 
between 30 and 60  minutes and then between 60 and 120 minutes. The fourth to last 
column indicates the results in the 24 hours following the first newswire report linked to a 
speech by an SNB official. The final three columns reflect the market behaviour on the day 
preceding the interview, the day of, and the day after. This allows us to compare the results 
obtained with the higher frequency intraday data and to infer whether other causes could 
have triggered the significant price movements we found. Daily data refer to values at one 
p.m. (GMT time). The table is broken into panels corresponding to whether a related 
newswire report was released within (Panel A) or out of (Panel B) trading hours.   
As can be gleaned from Panel A, we recorded a significant impact on the currency 18 times 
(out of 68, see Table 1) (26%). Some movement occurred between 30 minutes proceeding 
and 30 minutes following the first related newswire report. As mentioned above, price 
fluctuations before news arrivals are not to be taken as a sign of informed trading. Among 
the main reasons for early price movements considered in this study are overlapping events, 
deficient tracking of broadcasters, imprecise identification of event time, other 
informational events, and so on. After time-stamping each speech that affected the market 
we checked the preceding day for significant market movement and found nothing, thus 
corroborating our results. However, as shown in the last three rows of Panel A, speeches do 
not have a particular impact on the CHF/USD rate when compared with all other 
observations included in the sample. 
The entries in Panel B refer to speeches that were reported by newswire systems outside of 
trading hours. We recurred to daily data to capture the market impact at three different 
points in time, i.e. the day preceding the publication of an interview, the day coinciding 
with its publication and the day after. From a total of 78 speeches, 12 were found 
significant on any one of these days. We found a significant impact on the day a speech 
was given seven times. As can be inferred from the Anova F-statistic and the Variance F-
test, these speeches did affect the return mean and variance of the CHF/USD on 
communication days. 
   18
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Table 3.3 summarizes the significant reactions of the CHF/USD rate to SNB interviews. 
According to Panel A, 16 interviews (from a total of 54, see Table 1) were significant at 
intraday frequency (30%). Similar to speeches, interviews mostly affected the CHF/USD rate 
in the first two time windows. On six occasions we found significant market movement 30 
minutes ahead of a related newswire report. Likewise, a significant reaction occurred six 
times in the 30 minutes following an interview. In three cases there was market fluctuation 
in the pre- and the post 30-minute interval. In contrast to speeches, the currency market 
also reacted five times with a delay of one to two hours. This lasting impact of interviews 
may be due to the fact that this form of communication contains variegated and wide-
ranging contents, whose reading and assimilation can be more time-consuming.  
It is also noticeable that the forex market was not subject to significant fluctuations on 
days prior to an interview. Moreover, given that no lasting impact is detectable on the days 
when the interviews were reported by newswire systems but is mostly concentrated in one 
of the time windows, we conclude that the significant effects we found are genuinely linked 
to the interviews and not attributable to other events taking place beforehand. Both these 
and the results found for speeches uphold our findings. As follows from the last rows of 
Panel A, interviews do seem to cause market participants to react differently than on other 
days, 30 to 60 minutes following related newswire reporting. In particular, the variance of 
the CHF/USD rate increases. The sample statistics show that interviews have some overall 
significant effect on the forex market. See in particular the Variance F-test.  
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5.2 Effect on stocks 
Table 4.1 reviews the Swiss stock market’s reaction to policy decisions and remarks made at 
the General Meetings of the Stockholders. Its setup is identical to Table 3.1. The broad 
picture differs somewhat from our findings about the exchange rate. While policy 
announcements affected the CHF/USD mostly during the beginning of the sample,   19
significant effects on the Swiss equity market ensuing from SNB policy decisions are 
clustered in the middle of our sample, i.e. from March 2001 to June 2003.  
A number of further results emerge upon examination of Table 4.1. First, 9 of 35 events 
significantly influenced the stock market (26%). Five came about at scheduled meetings 
(22%) and four at unscheduled meetings (67%). Unscheduled announcements had the most 
significant effects. Given that the last unscheduled announcement dates from 6 March 
2003, this may explain why both currency market and stock market participants reacted less 
to SNB policy announcements in recent periods. Second, like the currency market, General 
Meetings triggered no reaction. Third, the equity market seems to need more time to absorb 
news related to monetary policy decisions than the foreign currency market. Most of the 
significant reactions occur within 30 minutes but in some circumstances 45 minutes are 
necessary. This may be interpreted as a slow price reaction, but it could also be for 
technical reasons. In particular, we are measuring the equity market reaction by means of 
the SPI index that includes all equity market capitalisations quoted at the SWX. Thus, the 
protracted market adjustment may stem from the most illiquid stocks. Fourth, the 
significant market movement was mostly downward. Fifth, as can be deduced from the 
statistical tests reported at the end of the table, monetary policy announcements do not 
appear to influence the stock market differently from other days’ news, apart from an 
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Table 4.2 summarizes significant stock market responses to SNB speeches. According to 
Panel A, 20 speeches were significant at intraday frequency (29%). Panel A makes at least 
two interesting points. First, speeches affect equity prices significantly. This is especially 
observable in terms of the Variance F-test. Second, a cluster of significant effects is 
identifiable in the first half of the sample. On two occasions we found a significant market 
effect both the day before and in the half hour before and the half hour after a speech. This 
observation suggests that the market was subject to large fluctuations that were not 
associated with SNB communication but rather with exogenous events. Another point worth   20
stressing is the incidence of some market rebounds taking place between the first time 
window (30 minutes before a speech) and subsequent intraday time windows. By way of 
example, the equity market switched from a positive price movement half an hour before a 
speech of 17 September 2001 to a negative reaction in the half hour following it. From the 
last row of Panel A we can infer that official SNB speeches had a distinct impact on the 
variance of stock prices directly prior to their reporting by newswire services, and in the two 
hours following reporting, in comparison with the whole sample of observations.  
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Table 4.3 summarizes significant effects of interviews on equities. A number of clear results 
are apparent upon closer examination of the table. First, as can be taken from Panel A, 21 
interviews reported during trading hours turn out to have been significant (39%). Second, 
interviews seem to have had an effect on equities in the middle of the sample, i.e. from 
May 2001 to October 2003. Third, if there was any significant market reaction, the effect 
was visible in more than one intraday time window. The effect was quite regularly spread 
over the 30-minute windows to the 24-hour window. Most significant effects are found 30 
minutes after the interview was reported by newswire systems. Fourth, the stock market 
tended to react positively to SNB interviews during 2003, whereas in general there was no 
unidirectional pattern. From the statistical tests at the bottom of Panel A we can see that 
interviews had a strong and distinct effect on equity prices’ variance at all intraday time 
windows examined.  
As can be seen in Panel B, we found significant market movement coinciding with SNB 
interview-related newswire system reports outside of working hours on 10 occasions (out of 
86). In keeping with the findings outlined in Panel A, there were clearly fewer market 
reactions at the beginning and at the end of the sample. Furthermore, the market reacted 
consistently positively to this form of SNB communication in 2003. Finally, interviews 
triggered an increase in equities’ variance different from other trading days. As already 
noted in Table 4.1 and 4.2, the variance impact was also remarkable for monetary policy 
decisions and speeches. We conclude from these observations that SNB communication 
tends to have a greater impact on the second moment of equities’ return distribution than   21
on the first moment, a finding that may be interpreted as proof of the heterogeneity in 
market participants’ expectations of risk premia. 
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5.3 Effects on bonds 
When comparing the effect of announcements on the bond market with the other two 
markets examined in the preceding subsections, it must be noted that the number of 
observations pertinent to monetary policy announcements available diminishes from 35 to 
29. As explained above, this is due to data unavailability for Swiss bond indices for the 
period 28 November 2002 to 7 November 2003. Thus we have to make do with 19 scheduled 
announcements, 5 unscheduled announcements and 5 General Meetings.  
Table 5.1 clearly shows that, of all assets, bonds are the most sensitive to monetary policy 
decisions - in line with previous rankings among financial assets suggested in the 
literature.
28 This is documented by all the sample tests, supporting the idea of a close link 
between monetary policy and the bond discount factor that ultimately determines bond 
values. 
Several additional results emerge from Table 5.1. First, not only monetary policy 
announcements, of which 8 were scheduled and 3 unscheduled but also - in contrast to the 
other two markets - addresses at the General Meetings, had 3 times as statistically 
significant effect on bond prices. Second, in contrast to the CHF/USD rate and the stock 
exchange, the effect of the Swiss monetary authorities is concentrated in the last period of 
this sample, beginning with the Board’s resolution to abandon its expansionary policy 
course.
29 Third, bonds reacted to policy decisions with a lag varying from 5 to 30 minutes. 
In most cases the responses were unidirectional, mainly downward. However, the 
announcements of the last two monetary policy meetings covered in this paper (15 
September and 12 December 2005) were accompanied by an upward movement in bond 
prices. Finally, judged by all three statistical tests conducted, monetary policy 
                                                           
28 See, for instance, Andersen et al. (2005). 
29 Note, however, that six venues in 2003 are missing.   22
announcements exerted a particular influence on bond prices, ascertainable in the first 30 
minutes after the event, distinguishable from other days. 
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In Table 5.2 we report the implications of speeches on the bond market. Panel A shows that 
41 speeches had an effect on bonds (60%). On 15 occasions the bond market was affected 
ahead of newswire reporting. Similarly, 15 speeches led to market reactions within 30 
minutes following a connected report. On three occasions we note a significant fluctuation 
both 30 minutes prior to and 30 minutes subsequent to a newswire. Only once (7 December 
2005) did we detect a significant market movement the preceding day as well as a 
significant fluctuation in the bond market 30 minutes ahead of a speech.  
In order to gauge the reaction of bonds to speeches given during business hours, we 
examined the market on the day preceding a speech, the day of, and the day after (Panel 
B). Thirteen speeches coincided with a significant market reaction on one of these days. 
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Table 5.3 lists all interviews that significantly affected the bond market. According to Panel 
A, 31 interviews (57%) went hand in hand with a significant market reaction in one of the 
time windows considered - ranging from 30 minutes ahead of the first newswire report to 24 
hours after it. On six occasions we detected a movement that preceded a newswire report 
related to an SNB interview. The bulk, exhibiting a negative market impact, is clustered 
around September 2002 and February 2003. Interestingly, the market displays only a few   23
significant reactions in the 30-60 minute window. Rather, bonds tended to react either with 
a delay of 30 minutes or with a lag of one to two hours. Similar to speeches, interviews 
often have a drawn-out effect noticeable even 24 hours following the communication. On 
four different occasions, bonds fluctuated significantly on the day prior to the publication 
of an SNB interview that had a significant effect on the bond market the subsequent day. 
However, in none of these cases was there a significant market fluctuation in the 30 minute 
window before the interview was reported by the newswire systems. From this we conclude 
that the market was genuinely reacting to newswire reports about an SNB interview rather 
than to another, previous event. Significant market movements ahead of a newswire report 
are hardly attributable to interviews, given that neither their time nor date is public 
knowledge. From the statistical tests presented at the bottom of Panel A, we deduce that 
bonds in particular respond to SNB interviews with increasing variance and with a delay of 
thirty minutes.  
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5.4 Regression analysis 
The non-parametric approach employed so far allows us to infer the frequency with which 
central bank communication affects the financial markets. In this section we complement 
our analysis with a parametric test that summarizes the analysis and allows us to check the 
robustness of the results. Following Kohn and Sack (2004), we estimated the following 
regression equation: 
 
k t k t k t ff y , , 1 0 , η β α + Δ + = Δ   (1) 
 
where Δyt,k is the intraday change in the financial variable on day t and intraday time k. α 
is a constant; β captures the effects of the unexpected component of monetary policy 
decisions, measured by Δff. It is computed from the change in the nearest-to-maturity 
futures contract of the three-month Libor within the first 20 minutes (for announcements) 
or 30 minutes (for speeches and interviews) after the first newswire report on SNB 
communication. The error term,  k , t η , represents any other pricing factors affecting the 
financial variable, such as revisions of the implicit short-term interest rate path beyond the 
next three months, term premia, risk premia and all other possible asset-specific value 
drivers.    24
The results are reported in Table 5.4. The results for the coefficient β, which represents the 
monetary policy surprise,  are reported in the second column. The sign of the coefficient is 
as expected (with one exception). An (unexpected) interest rate increase tends to 
strengthen the Swiss franc to the US dollar while it negatively affects stock and bond 
market value. All three communication forms analyzed in this paper exhibit estimated β-
coefficients that are only weakly significant in statistical terms. By this measure, the 
strongest reaction is perceptible in the bond market and the weakest in the equity market 
where only announcements exhibit a statistically significant coefficient. The last column 
shows what we call the “variance ratio”. It represents the ratio of the variance of the error 
term  k , t η  for each financial variable on communication day t to the variance on all non-
communication days in the sample at the same intraday time k. That is, we contrast the 
intraday effect of communication days with those days that did not involve any policy 
announcements, speeches or interviews. Given that equation (1) controls for the direct 
effect of policy surprises, the residual  k , t η  should genuinely determine whether 
communication had any effect beyond the short-term policy outlook.  
The results show that monetary policy announcements had some effect beyond the 
contemporaneous policy decisions. The variance of the error term in the regression 
involving the exchange rate is sizable and statistically significant. Policy announcements 
also had a sizable and significant effect on the variance ratio of the bond market but no 
effect on equities’ variance ratio. Besides the announcements, only interviews increase the 
variance ratio. Overall, the results of the regression analysis are essentially in line with the 
non-parametric analysis. However, these results are based on relatively few observations 
and thus should be interpreted with due care.  
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Summary 
A number of clear results emerge from our analysis. First, we find that Swiss asset markets 
react significantly to monetary policy announcements. This finding is similar to previous 
research on other asset markets. Analyzing monetary policy case by case, we observe that 
not only some unscheduled monetary policy announcements but also some scheduled 
decisions moved the markets significantly. Thus, even if the monetary policy framework is 
highly transparent and substantiated by a high communication frequency, the information 
delivered at scheduled monetary policy decisions may contain news for market participants. 
Second, the reaction to monetary policy announcements was time-variant across the three 
markets. While the foreign exchange market reacted conspicuously at the beginning of the 
sample period, coinciding with a restrictive monetary policy, the equity market showed 
responsiveness in the middle of the sample, concomitant with a very expansionary monetary 
policy and record-low interest rates. Bonds responded towards the end of sample, a period 
marked by a gradual “normalization” of interest rates.  
Third, a novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that speeches and interviews by 
central bank officials also affect asset markets. This empirical evidence suggests that market 
participants are receptive to central bank information. In general, interviews seem to 
influence the financial markets more than speeches. While the effects on the currency 
market were relatively modest, both communication forms tended to strongly affect the 
bond market. Interviews also had a perceptible impact on the stock market.  
Fourth, of all the markets, the bond market is clearly the most responsive to all three 
communication tools considered in this paper. While the sensitivity of bonds to monetary 
policy announcements has been documented in the literature, we report evidence that 
bonds in particular also respond significantly to speeches and interviews. Equities display 
the least reaction of all three markets. One explanation resides in the factors determining 
the discounted value of these assets. By simply splitting the discount factor into three main 
components, we can interpret the value drivers as the real interest rate, expected inflation 
and risk premia. Bonds appear to manifest the closest link with monetary policy since two 
of the three main ingredients making up the bond discount factor (i.e. real interest rates 
and expected inflation) largely depend on central bank decisions. Exchange rates are 
essentially valued in terms of economic fundamentals that, in turn, significantly depend on 
monetary policy too. On the other hand, discounted equity values may be largely influenced 
by risk premia. Also, dividend and cash-flow streams are more influenced by corporate-
specific issues than monetary policy decisions. This should also explain why equity prices 
reveal less sensitivity to central bank communication than bonds and exchange rates.    26
Fifth, our analysis shows the typical patterns and timing of communication impacts. The 
strongest effect of policy announcements on the foreign exchange market crops up within 
15 minutes. Bonds react within 30 minutes, but mostly between 5 and 15 minutes. Equities 
are the most sluggish, reacting with a delay of up to 60 minutes. Reactions to speeches and 
interviews last longer on all three markets and are more difficult to situate. This may be due 
to technical aspects such as index construction including less liquid assets or the more 
time-consuming analysis required, in contrast to interest rate decisions. It is also possible 
that a protracted re-valuation process elicited by monetary policy news is a sign of market 
participants’ heterogeneity. The fact that a price reaction is still visible one or two hours 
after a news release may also be due to more passive traders. Another plausible explanation 
for sluggish market responses is that there are many information sources available and that 
the same news provider may release information updates related to the original news item. 
Given the possibility that broadcasters release the same news items in a non-synchronised 
way and/or quote each other within a short period of time, multiple information sources 
may translate into a longer-lasting impact of news items.  
Sixth, as far as speeches and interviews are concerned, we perceive immediate and 
occasionally even premature market fluctuations with respect to newswire reports. This may 
be due to the limited number of newswire broadcasters covered in our analysis. By the same 
token, this could also be traced to the presence of traders actively monitoring and promptly 
reacting to information flows. A further explanation could be found in the methodological 
limitations of our event study setup. 
Finally, while at the beginning of the sample period it was the currency market that 
responded most aggressively to SNB communication, in the later period it was the bond 
market. Monetary policy was continuously loosened from 2001 to 2003, evidenced by a 
reduction in the three-month Libor from 3.25% to a trough of 0.25%. It was not until mid-
June 2004 that a gradual “normalization” of interest rates set in. Hence, it appears that the 
currency market was more sensitive to communications when interest rates were falling 
whereas the bond market responded more when interest rates began to rise. Arguably, as 
short-term interest rates approach the zero lower bound, more interventions on the currency 
market may be called for. However, this reading of the results is clouded by the lack of data 
on bond markets from the end of 2002 to the end of 2003. Overall, the interpretation of 
these findings must not stretch a point. The sample is too short for a comprehensive 
analysis.  
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6. Conclusions 
Communication provides monetary policy authorities with an effective means of explaining 
their thinking and decisions. As such, communication is potentially an important avenue for 
central bankers to disseminate valuable information to investors. This paper adds to the 
expanding literature on central bank transparency by highlighting the effects of SNB 
communication on asset markets from 2000 to 2005. We provide evidence for intraday 
patterns of financial market reactions, suggesting that market participants react promptly 
to SNB communication. Significant market movement at the time of the earliest news 
release suggests that traders actively monitor real-time central bank information. 
Our results, derived from Swiss financial data, hint at three conclusions. First, a new result 
borne of our analysis is that speeches and interviews by central bank officials do provide 
important information to market participants. In line with previous research, we also find 
that monetary policy announcements have a significant impact on financial assets. Second, 
a significant market reaction is observable for the bond, equity and foreign currency 
markets. This result is important in several respects. It shows that market participants pay 
heed to this form of communication, through which central banks can convey information 
in a flexible way. Speeches and interviews complement monetary policy announcements in 
notifying market participants of past, current and future SNB decisions and economic 
conditions. Overall, they may effectively contribute to enhancing the transparency of a 
central bank authority. Third, using a new high-frequency database allowed us to accurately 
analyze market reactions to real-time communication. The bond market is the most 
responsive to public announcements, followed by the currency market, while the stock 
exchange is the least reactive. We attribute these diverse reaction patterns to the various 
relationships between monetary policy and discounted asset values. In this paper we have 
focused on the use of communication tools and the associated market reactions. Further 
research could be devoted to the content, the clarity, the length and complexity of central 
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Table 1: Communication items 
 
 Monetary  policy 
announcements  Speeches      Interviews   
Panel A: Summary  Number Rel.  Freq.  Number Rel.  Freq.   Number Rel.  Freq. 
All  36  100%   146 100%    177 100% 
Within trading hours (from 9 to 17)  35  97%    68  47%    54  30% 
Off  market  1  3%    78 53%    86 49% 
During weekends  0  0%    0  0%    37  21% 
              
Panel B: By year              
2000  -  -    14 10%    26 14% 
2001 -  -    13  9%    34  19% 
2002  -  -    31 21%    38 22% 
2003  -  -    23 16%    38 22% 
2004  -  -    29 20%    21 12% 
2005  -  -    36 24%    20 11% 
    33
Table 2: SNB Monetary policy announcements  
 
Date  Issuance time   Event 
New mid-point 
target Surprise  t-stat 
20.01.2000 09:31  Unscheduled  2  0.018*  1.94 
03.02.2000 13:55  Unscheduled 2.25 0.067***  7.12 
23.03.2000 14:00  Scheduled  3  0.054***  6.04 
28.04.2000 10:00  General  Meeting 3  0.009  0.98 
15.06.2000 08:50  Scheduled 3.5 0.003  0.33 
14.09.2000 14:15  Scheduled  3.5  -0.003  0.33 
08.12.2000 09:45  Scheduled  3.5  0  0.00 
22.03.2001 14:00  Scheduled 3.25 0.003  0.38 
20.04.2001 10:00  General  Meeting 3.25  -0.006  0.71 
14.06.2001 09:30  Scheduled 3.25 0.006  0.70 
17.09.2001 17:43  Unscheduled  2.75  NA  NA 
24.09.2001 14:00  Unscheduled 2.25  -0.045***  5.08 
07.12.2001 09:45  Scheduled  1.75  0  0.00 
21.03.2002  14:00 Scheduled  1.75 0.025***  2.80 
26.04.2002 10:00  General  Meeting 1.75  0.019**  2.10 
02.05.2002 11:40  Unscheduled  1.25  -0.016*  1.74 
14.06.2002 09:30  Scheduled  1.25  -0.008  0.88 
26.07.2002 13:00  Unscheduled  0.75  -0.178*** 20.02 
19.09.2002 14:00  Scheduled 0.75  0.029***  3.26 
13.12.2002 09:45  Scheduled  0.75  0  0.00 
06.03.2003 13:51  Unscheduled  0.25  -0.474*** 53.22 
20.03.2003 14:00  Scheduled  0.25  0  0.00 
25.04.2003 10:00  General  Meeting 0.25  0  0.00 
13.06.2003 09:30  Scheduled 0.25  0.08***  8.99 
18.09.2003 14:00  Scheduled 0.25  -0.087***  9.77 
12.12.2003 09:45  Scheduled  0.25  0  0.00 
18.03.2004 14:00  Scheduled  0.25  0  0.00 
30.04.2004 10:00  General  Meeting 0.25  -0.057*** 6.42 
17.06.2004 09:28  Scheduled 0.5  -0.057***  6.42 
16.09.2004 13:58  Scheduled  0.75  -0.011  1.23 
16.12.2004 09:30  Scheduled  0.75  -0.067*** 7.49 
17.03.2005 13:59  Scheduled 0.75 -0.024  2.74 
29.04.2005 10:00  General  Meeting 0.75  0.013  1.49 
16.06.2005 09:29  Scheduled  0.75  0  0.00 
15.09.2005 13:59  Scheduled 0.75  -0.026***  2.92 
15.12.2005 09:29  Scheduled  1  -0.01  1.10 
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Table 3.1: Foreign exchange market reactions to monetary policy announcements 
 
Date S/U*  Surprise 
15 min 
before  5 min after 
From 5 to 
15 min 
From 15 to 
30 min 
From 30 to 
45 min 
From 45 to 
60 min 
20.01.2000 U  0.018*  -0.0011  0.0003 -0.0002  0.0034**  -0.0005 0.0016 
03.02.2000 U  0.067***  0.0012  0.0018**  -0.0046*** 0.0005  -0.0026*  0.0012 
23.03.2000 S  0.054***  0.0005  -0.0039***  -0.0025*  -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0003 
28.04.2000 G  0.009  0.0012  0.0006  -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0014 
15.06.2000 S  0.003  -0.0008  0.0018** 0.002  0.001  0.0014 -0.0007 
14.09.2000 S  -0.003  0.0029  0.0008 0.0003 0.0007 0.0013 0.0016 
08.12.2000 S 0  0.0014  0.0036***  -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0001 
22.03.2001 S  0.003  0.001  -0.0022** 0.0026**  -0.0022  0.0019  0.0026* 
20.04.2001 G  -0.006  0.0004  0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0004 
14.06.2001 S  0.006  -0.0006  -0.0009 0.0006  0  -0.0009 0.0002 
24.09.2001 U  -0.045***  0.0001  0.0021** 0.0010  0.0019  -0.0009 -0.0006 
07.12.2001 S 0  0.0007  0.0002  0.0006 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 
21.03.2002 S  0.025***  -0.0001  -0.0008 0.0005 0.0008  0.001  -0.0005 
26.04.2002 G  0.019**  0.0023  -0.0003  -0.0006 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0002 
02.05.2002 U  -0.016*  0.0023  -0.0002 0.0007 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0002 
14.06.2002 S  -0.008  0.0012  -0.0005 0.0003 0.0012  -0.001  0.0004 
26.07.2002 U  -0.178***  -0.0006  0.0027**  -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0005 
19.09.2002 S  0.029***  0.0009  0  -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0004 
13.12.2002  S 0  0 -0.0003 0 -0.0002  0.0002  -0.0018 
06.03.2003  U  -0.474***  0.0000 0.0014 0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0010 
20.03.2003 S 0  0.0001  0.0005  0.0017 0 -0.0003  -0.0013 
25.04.2003 G 0  -0.0007  0.0007  -0.0003 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0009 
13.06.2003 S  0.08***  -0.0008  0.0006  -0.0027** 0.0003  0.0016  -0.0008 
18.09.2003 S  -0.087***  0.0004  -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0005  0.0001 
12.12.2003 S 0 -0.0002  0.0001  0.0002 0.0015 -0.0008  -0.0007 
18.03.2004 S 0  0.0002  0.0002  -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0006  0 
30.04.2004 G  -0.057***  0.0001  0.0002  0.0018 -0.001 0.0007  -0.0001 
17.06.2004 S  -0.057***  -0.0012  -0.019** -0.0033**  -0.0013  0.0000  0.0004 
16.09.2004 S  -0.011  0.0005  0.0002  0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0002 
16.12.2004 S  -0.067***  -0.0001  0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 
17.03.2005 S  -0.024  0.0003  0.0013 0.0006 0.0009 0.0017 -0.0006 
29.04.2005 G  0.013  0.0001  -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 
16.06.2005 S  -0.001  -0.0004  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0006 
15.09.2005 S  -0.026***  -0.0008  0.0011 0.0005 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0006 
15.12.2005 S  -0.01  -0.0002  0.0005  0.001 -0.0009  -0.0015  0.0009 
All announcements                      
Anova F-stat    622***  6.11**  15.87*** 51.47***  7.66***  0.18  0.05 
Med. Chi-sq.    3.25**  2.35  3.28** 10.35***  3.47*  0.27  2.32 
Variance  F-test    4229***  1.14  9.49***  8.24***  1.36 1.47 1.01 
Scheduled only                         
Anova F-stat    161***  4.86** 3.54*  54.63***  2.79*  2.46  0.09 
Med.  Chi-sq.    2.78*  1.69 1.42  7.78***  1.7  1.69 1.69 
Variance F-test     816***  1.03  8.93***  6.69***  1.01  1.14  1.07 
No unscheduled, no general meetings                
Anova F-stat    188***  2.49  3.30* 35.3*** 2.86*  0.83  0.06 
Med. Chi-sq.    2.9*  0.67  0.99  5.28**  2.13 0.05 0.04 
Variance F-test     1345***  1.01  10.92***  7.72***  1.02  1.33  1.07 
 
* S means scheduled monetary policy decisions; U means unscheduled monetary policy decisions; G stands for General 
Meeting. 
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Table 3.2: Foreign exchange market reactions to official speeches 
 






from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
within 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
03.04.2000 -0.0037*** -0.0009  -  - 0.0062  -0.0054  0.0000  0.0000 
12.05.2000 -0.0019  -0.0026** 0.0006  -0.0016 -0.0102 0.0000  0.0068  -0.0150** 
14.09.2001 -0.0006 -0.0022*  -0.0023* -0.0016 -0.0265*** -0.0046  -0.0081  0.0000 
17.09.2001 -0.0026**  -0.0053*** 0.0007  0.0019 0.0061 -0.0081  -0.0288***  0.0098 
22.10.2001 0.0035***  0.0014  -  -  0.0048 0.0021 0.0025  0.0116* 
06.03.2002 -0.0028**  0.0008  -  -  -0.0089 -0.0057 0.0000  -0.0135** 
18.06.2002
a -0.0004  -0.0007  0.0002  -0.0008  -0.0123* -0.0011  -0.0033  -0.0089 
23.07.2002 0.0024* 0.0022* -0.0023* 0.0004  -0.0007 -0.0011 0.0194*** 0.0002 
21.05.2003 0.001  0.0011 0.0002  -0.005***  0.0004 0.0059 -0.0092 0.0070 
05.06.2003
a -0.0035***  -0.0033***  0.0005  -0.0015 0.0088 0.0054 0.0077  -0.0122* 
26.06.2003 0.003**  0.0002  -0.0014 0.0017 0.0086 0.0012 0.0071  0.0129* 
27.10.2003 0 -0.0001  -0.0014  0.0033*  0.0039 0.0044 0.0019 0.0025 
05.12.2003 0.001 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.002 -0.013* 0.0010 0.0004  -0.0148** 
07.05.2004 0.0005  0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0138** 0.0002  0.0094  0.0090 
18.11.2004 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0024*    -0.0049 -0.0018 -0.0087 0.0000 
29.11.2004 - -0.0004  -0.0023*  0.002  -0.003 0.0020  -0.0024  -0.0021 
29.08.2005 0.0002 -0.0007  -  -  0.0129* -0.0039 -0.0004 0.0110* 
29.11.2005 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0031* 0.0035 0.0022 -0.0101 0.0041 
          
%  signif.  10%  7% 6% 4% 7% 0% 3%  10% 
Anova F-stat  0.89  0.04  0.06 0.07 0.05 0.37 0.30 0.33 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.68  0.68  0.11 0.35 0.39 0.06 0.53 0.01 
Var.  F-test  1.14 1.11  1.38*  1.25 1.34 1.06 1.12 1.35 
Panel B: off market         
date day  before  same  day  day  after        
28.02.2000  0.0066  0.0179***  -0.0070        
21.12.2000  -0.0010  -0.0126*  -0.0009        
07.03.2002  0.0000  -0.0135**  -0.0023        
21.06.2002  -0.0061  -0.0091  -0.0120*        
25.06.2002  -0.0120*  0.0067  -0.0182***        
17.03.2003  0.0121*  -0.0046  0.0219***        
31.03.2003  -0.0007 -0.0137** -0.0037           
16.06.2003  0.0057  -0.0124*  0.0054        
22.10.2004  -0.0048  0.0017  -0.0157**        
05.01.2005  0.0134**  0.0135**  0.0049        
22.02.2005  -0.0008  -0.0122*  -0.0047       
10.06.2005  0.0063  0.0020  0.0146**       
          
%  signif.  4%  9%  6%       
Anova  F-stat  0.84  4.78**  0.72        
Med.  Chi-sq.  0.02  1.12  1.51        
Var.  F-test  1.14  2.95**  2.79**        
 
a Overlapping events: this speech was preceded by an interview.  36
Table 3.3: Foreign exchange market reactions to interviews 
 






from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
within 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
02.03.2000 -0.0029 0.0004** 0.0001  0.0000 0.0065 0.0067 -0.0027 0.008 
31.08.2000 -0.0012  0.0033  0.0016***  0.0002 0.0066  0.016**  -0.0055 0.0058 
18.01.2001 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0044  -0.0001***  -0.0097 0.0034 -0.0023  -0.0126* 
10.05.2001 0.0015  0.00293**  0.0014 0.0034* 0.0090  0.0026  0  -0.0039 
21.09.2001 0.0000  -0.0087***  0.0010 -0.0018 0.0047 -0.0043  -0.0136**  0.0136** 
04.03.2002 0.0000 -0.0001  0.0006 -0.0030* -0.0058  -0.0038  0.0063  -0.0057 
23.07.2002
a 0.0022* -0.0030**  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0038 -0.0011  0.0194***  0.0002 
27.01.2003 0.0005  0.0008  0.0002  0.0051*** 0.0080  -0.0046  -0.0069  0 
02.04.2003 0.0033***  0.0009  -0.0006 0.0015 0.0073 -0.0037 0.0103 0.0069 
07.04.2003 -0.0023*  0.0009  0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0088 0.0047  0.0151**  -0.0099 
05.06.2003 -0.0032***  -0.0037***  -0.0044***  -0.0012 -0.0076 0.0054  0.0077 -0.0122* 
18.06.2003 0.0007  0.0004  0.0014 0.0032*  0.0157** 0.0054  0.0068 0.0156** 
21.08.2003 0.0014  0.0006  0.0000 0.0009  0.0121*  -0.0039 0.0061 0.0092 
22.10.2003 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0013  0.0000  -0.0151** 0.0042  -0.0053 -0.0143** 
29.01.2004 -0.0033***  -0.0045***  0.0010  0.0016 0.0122* -0.0094 0.0056  0.0086 
07.04.2004 -0.0028** -0.0012  0.0010  -0.0008 -0.0126* 0.0041  -0.0075  -0.0097 
          
%  signif. 11%  11% 2% 11% 9%  2%  6%  7% 
Anova F-stat  0.31  0.20  2.67*  1.29 0.05 0.48 1.41 0.55 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.71  0.71  3.73*  0.38 0.09 0.24 0.01 0.58 
Var.  F-test  1.20  2.16***  1.19 1.23 1.19 1.01 1.10 1.18 
Panel B: off market          
date day  before  same  day  day  after       
12.01.2001  0.0022  -0.0054  0.0147**        
19.01.2001  -0.0023  -0.0126*  0.0183***        
27.04.2001  -0.004  -0.0036  0.0127*        
09.10.2001  -0.0097  0.0027  0.0111*        
28.01.2002  0.003  0.0159**  0.0015        
29.01.2003  0.009  -0.009  0.0124*        
04.03.2003  -0.0055  -0.0113*  -0.006        
18.03.2003  -0.0046  0.0219***  -0.0017        
28.05.2004  -0.0024  -0.0164**  0        
24.10.2004    0  -0.0157*        
            
%  signif.  0%  5%  5%       
Anova  F-stat  0.04  0.13  0.01       
Med.  Chi-sq.  0.08  2.53  2.54        
Var.  F-test  1.52**  1.13  1.35*        
 
a Overlapping events: this interview was preceded by a speech  37
Table 4.1: Swiss equity market reactions to monetary policy announcements 
 
Date S/U*  Surprise 
15 min 
before  5 min after 
From 5 to 
15 min 
From 15 to 
30 min 
From 30 to 
45 min 
From 45 to 
60 min 
20.01.2000 U  0.018* 0.0002 -0.0003  -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0002  -0.0039* 
03.02.2000 U  0.067***  0.0012 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 
23.03.2000 S  0.054***  -0.001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0013 -0.002 -0.0007 
28.04.2000 G 0.009 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0007  -0.0001 
15.06.2000 S 0.003  0  -0.0006 0.0018 0.0007 -0.0005  -0.0001 
14.09.2000 S  -0.003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0015 0.0005 0.0012 0.0013 
08.12.2000 S  0  0.0012 0.0005 0.0007 0.0021 -0.0024 0.0001 
22.03.2001 S 0.003 -0.0025  0.0027** 0.0022 -0.0043** 0.0033 0.0046** 
20.04.2001 G  -0.006 -0.0007  -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0005  0.001  -0.0004 
14.06.2001 S 0.006 -0.0018 0.0003 -0.001 -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0003 
24.09.2001 U  -0.045***  0.0001 0.0011 0.0058*** -0.0008  0.002  0.0033 
07.12.2001 S  0  0.0026 -0.0005  -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0028 0.0011 
21.03.2002 S  0.025***  -0.0001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 
26.04.2002 G  0.019**  -0.0001  -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0005 -0.0002 
02.05.2002 U  -0.016*  -0.0001  -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0001  0.0011 
14.06.2002 S  -0.008  -0.0037*  -0.0007 -0.0040** 0.0019 -0.0047**  -0.00025 
26.07.2002 U  -0.178***  0.0018  0.002 -0.0008  0.0045**  0.0037*  0.0025 
19.09.2002 S  0.029***  0.0007 0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0037* 0.0023  0.0003 
13.12.2002 S  0  0.0014 -0.0002 0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0009  0.002 
06.03.2003 U  -0.474***  -0.0025  -0.0042***  0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0013 
20.03.2003 S  0  0.0002 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0002  -0.0044** 
25.04.2003 G  0  0  0.0008 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0011 
13.06.2003 S  0.08***  -0.0031  -0.0015 -0.0038** -0.0013  -0.0011  0.0004 
18.09.2003 S  -0.087***  -0.0008 0.0005 0.0018  0.001  0.0005 0.0005 
12.12.2003 S  0  -0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0004 
18.03.2004 S  0  0.0011 -0.0009  -0.0008 0 -0.0001  -0.0022 
30.04.2004 G  -0.057***  0.0001 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003 
17.06.2004 S  -0.057***  0.0012 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 
16.09.2004 S  -0.011 -0.0007 0.0001 0.001 0.0016  -0.0002  0 
16.12.2004 S  -0.067***  0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003  0 
17.03.2005 S  -0.024  0  0.0004 0  0.001  0.0002 0 
29.04.2005 G 0.013  0.0013 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0028  0  0 
16.06.2005 S  0  0.0001 0.0002 -0.0007 0 -0.0002  -0.0002 
15.09.2005 S  -0.026***  -0.0002  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004  0.0006 -0.0002 
15.12.2005  S  -0.01  -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0018  0 
All announcements                      
Anova F-stat    622***  0.34  0.77 0.52 0.61  0.1  0.05 
Med. Chi-sq.    3.25**  0.72  1.33 0.03 0.71  0.6 3.46* 
Var.  F-test    4229***  2.27***  1.31 1.21  1.4 1.68*  1.59* 
Scheduled only                      
Anova F-stat    161***  0.47 0.05 0.52  0.6  0.1  0.15 
Med. Chi-sq.    2.78*  1.69  0.92 0.04 0.71 0.25 0.59 
Var. F-test     816***  2.28***  2.34***  1.21  1.41  1.68**  1.59* 
No unscheduled, no general meetings                
Anova F-stat    188***  0.52  0.12 0.14  0.4  0.7  0.02 
Med.  Chi-sq.    2.9* 1.08 1.14 0.39 0.04 1.08  2.1 
Var. F-test     1345***  1.94**  1.98***  1.07  1.04  1.52  1.45 
 
* S means scheduled monetary policy decisions; U means unscheduled monetary policy decisions; G stands for General 
Meeting.  38
Table 4.2: Swiss equity market reactions to official speeches 
 






from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
within 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
24.02.2000 0.0007 -0.0006  0  0.0008  -0.0155** 0.0075  -0.0031  -0.006 
03.04.2000 -0.0011  0.0005  0.0048***  0.0012 0.0049 0.0053  0.008  0.0048 
25.08.2000
a 0.0012  0.0004  0.0029*  0.0008  0.0041 -0.0019 -0.0039  0.003 
07.09.2001 -0.0023 0.0030* 0.0010 -0.0025 0.0034 -0.0162  -0.0201*  -0.0199* 
14.09.2001 -0.0019 0.0027 -0.0027  -0.0077***  -0.0518*** 0.0092 -0.0443***  0 
17.09.2001 0.0029*  -0.0055***  0.0031* -0.0027 0.0496***  -0.0443***  0.0256**  -0.0119 
22.10.2001 -0.0004 0.0019  0.0062***  0.0026 0.0111 -0.0038 0.0164 0.0157 
07.11.2001 0.001  0.0001 0.0001  -0.0023 0.0176** 0.0018  0.0024 0.0223** 
26.02.2002 -0.0018 -0.0006  0.0003  -0.0056**  -0.0031 0.0072 -0.0036 0.0166 
18.06.2002
a -0.0003 -0.0042** -0.0004  -0.0032  -0.0035 0.0276** -0.0132  -0.0156 
23.07.2002 0.0086***  -0.0041** -0.0009  -0.0004 -0.0427***  -0.0539*** -0.0159  -0.0084 
04.09.2002 0.0016  -0.0094***  -0.0002  0.0053** -0.0129*  -0.0333*** 0.0071  -0.0015 
23.09.2002 0.0025  0.0018  0.0006 -0.0009  -0.0441*** 0.0012 -0.0356*** -0.001 
30.11.2002 -0.0012  0.0039**  0.0046***  0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0052 0.0067  -0.0268** 
05.06.2003
a  -0.0071***  -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0017 0.0046 0.0071 -0.0079 0.0165 
26.06.2003 0.0003  0.0037**  -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0025 0.0006  0.0031  0.0009 
19.08.2003 0.0018 0.0005  0  -0.0043* -0.0029  0.0055  0.004  -0.0056 
30.08.2003 -0.0076***  0.0026  0.0005 0.0054** 0.0023  -0.0131  0.0174  -0.0054 
19.11.2004 0.0006  0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0001  -0.0143*  -0.0009 -0.0109 -0.0076 
07.12.2005 -0.0003  -0.001  0.0007 0.0046* 0.0014  0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0035 
          
%  signif.  6% 10% 7%  9% 12% 6%  6%  4% 
Anova F-stat  0.18  0.41  0.44 0.91 1.23 1.82 0.08 0.03 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.01  0.72  0.19  6.49**  0.01 0.02 0.13 0.13 
Var.  F-test 1.96***  2.21*** 3.42** 4.07***  1.2  1.04  1.09  1.23 
Panel B: off market          
date day  before  same  day  day  after       
30.10.2001  -0.0184  -0.0211*  0.0119        
18.02.2002  -0.0006  -0.0055  -0.022*        
12.06.2002  0.0097  -0.0289**  -0.0140        
21.06.2002  -0.0306***  0.0018  -0.0324***        
25.06.2002  -0.0324***  0.0306***  -0.0263**        
10.09.2002  -0.0134  0.0168  0.0226**        
26.09.2002  0.0166  0.0492***  0.0025        
30.09.2002  0.0025  -0.0235**  -0.0133        
22.10.2002  -0.0095  -0.0072  -0.0219*        
21.01.2003  -0.0148  -0.0053  -0.0265**        
24.01.2003  0.0001  -0.0106  -0.0356***        
17.03.2003  0.053***  0.0262**  0.0089        
31.03.2003  0.0036  -0.0274**  0.0111        
22.05.2003  -0.0134  0.0245**  0.0017        
16.06.2003  -0.0166  0.0198*  0.0095       
02.10.2003  0.0028  0.0043  0.0231**       
          
%  signif.  4%  12%  10%        
Anova  F-stat  0.1  0.7  1.24        
Med.  Chi-sq.  1.23  1.61  0.01        
Var.  F-test  1.19  1.05  1.17        
 
a Overlapping events: this speech was preceded by an interview.   39
Table 4.3: Swiss equity market reactions to interviews 
 






from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
within 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
11.05.2000 0.0016 0.0029* 0.0026  0.0029 0.0174** -0.0047  0.0162  0.0046 
10.05.2001 0.0031*  0.0004  0.0003  0.0012 0.0019 -0.0073  0  0.0138 
21.09.2001 -0.0066***  -0.0084***  0.0084***  -0.0108***  0.0049 -0.0454***  -0.0518***  0.0569*** 
03.01.2002  0.0027 -0.0048*** 0.0003  -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0072 0.0018  0.003 
18.06.2002  -0.0012  -0.0015 -0.007*** -0.0024 -0.0043  0.0276**  -0.0132 -0.0156 
23.07.2002
a -0.0036**  0.0015  -0.0011  -0.0061** -0.069***  -0.0539  -0.0159***  -0.0084 
25.07.2002 -0.0076***  -0.0035**  0.0029 0.0149***  0.0471*** -0.0084 0.0579*** 0.0218* 
02.09.2002 -0.0026  -0.0055***  0.0006 0.0028 -0.0116 0.0181  -0.0248**  -0.0333*** 
12.09.2002 0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0015 -0.0192**  0.0226**  -0.0308***  -0.0233** 
11.11.2002 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0047* 0.0068 -0.0104 -0.0108 0.0123 
05.12.2002 0.0012 -0.0031* 0.0002  -0.0051** -0.028***  0.0002  -0.0113  -0.0038 
20.12.2002 0  0.0003  -0.0024  0.0053**  0.0027 -0.0046 -0.0010 -0.0086 
27.01.2003 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0041*  0.0101*** -0.023***  -0.0106  -0.0356***  0 
28.01.2003 0.0009  -0.0059***  -0.0084***  -0.0016 -0.024***  -0.0356***  -0.0038  0.0047 
24.02.2003 -0.0021  0.0012  -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0136*  0.003  -0.0109 -0.0201* 
02.04.2003 0.0095***  0.0061*** -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0147* 0.0111  0.0308***  0.0121 
07.04.2003 0.0003 0.0031*  0.004 0.004 -0.009  0.0147 0.0232** -0.0056 
05.06.2003 -0.0021  0.0018  -0.0055**  -0.0026 -0.0009 0.0071 -0.0079 0.0165 
18.06.2003 0.0011  0.0038**  0.0042* 0.0024 0.0027 0.0095 0.0077 -0.0141 
15.08.2003
b 0.0007 0.0048***  -0.0019  -0.0017 0.0087  0.008  0.0119 0.0055 
01.10.2003 -0.0038**  0.002  0.0022  -0.0056**  0.0041 -0.0112 0.0028 0.0043 
          
%  signif. 13% 20% 11% 15% 17%  7%  15%  9% 
Anova F-stat  0.05  0.02  0.31 0.11 0.80  0  0.10 0.03 
Med. Chi-sq.  3.65*  1.86  1.19 0.00 1.43 0.31 0.68 0.68 
Var.  F-test 1.53** 1.47**  1.36*  1.41*  1.59** 1.63**  1.92***  1.13 
Panel B: off market          
date day  before  same  day  day  after       
06.10.2000  0.0021  -0.0051  -0.0197*        
19.02.2002 -0.0055 -0.022* -0.0056           
03.07.2002  -0.0204*  -0.0247**  0.0224**        
06.11.2002  0.0022  -0.0045  -0.0206*        
04.03.2003  0.0089  -0.0323***  -0.0192**        
12.03.2003 -0.0039 -0.0113 0.029**           
18.03.2003  0.0262** 0.0089 0.0224**           
14.04.2003  0.0161  0.0091  0.0229**        
16.06.2003 -0.0166 0.0198* 0.0095           
19.10.2005  0.0077  -0.0184*  0.009        
            
%  signif.  2%  4%  6%       
Anova  F-stat  0.29  0.4  0.01       
Med.  Chi-sq.  0.01  2.65*  0.59       
Var.  F-test  2.33***  1.47***  1.2        
 
a Overlapping events: this interview was preceded by a speech.  
b Overlapping events: this interview was preceded by another interview.  40
Table 5.1: Swiss bond market reactions to monetary policy announcements 
 
Date S/U*  Surprise 
15 min 
before  5 min after 
From 5 to 15 
min 
From 15 to 
30 min 
From 30 to 
45 min 
From 45 to 
60 min 
20.01.2000 U  0.018*  0  0  -0.0001 0.0001  0.0006**  0 
03.02.2000  U  0.067*** 0.0002  0.0001 0.0005** -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001 
23.03.2000 S 0.054***  0  0  -0.0004** -0.0001  -0.0001  0 
28.04.2000 G  0.009  0  -0.0004*** 0.0004*  0  0  0.0001 
15.06.2000 S  0.003  0.0002  0  0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
14.09.2000 S  -0.003  0  0  0  0.0002  0.0001  0 
08.12.2000 S  0  -0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 0.0003  0  0 
22.03.2001 S  0.003  0  0  0.0002 -0.0001  0  -0.0001 
20.04.2001 G  -0.006  -0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003  0 
14.06.2001 S  0.006  0.0002  -0.0002* -0.0004* -0.0004  -0.0006**  -0.0005* 
24.09.2001 U -0.045*** -0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0  0.0001 
07.12.2001 S  0  0  0.0001 0.0001  0  -0.0003 0.0002 
21.03.2002 S 0.025***  0  0.0002  -0.0002 0 -0.0001 0 
26.04.2002 G  0.019**  -0.0002  0  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002  0 
02.05.2002 U  -0.016*  0  0  0.0003 0.0005** 0.0001  0.0002 
14.06.2002 S  -0.008  0.0002  -0.0003 0  0  0 0.0001 
26.07.2002 U -0.178*** -0.0004  0  0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
19.09.2002 S 0.029***  0  0  0.0001 0.0001 0.0004  0 
13.12.2002  S  0 0.0002  -0.0001 0 0.0001  0.0001 0 
18.03.2004 S  0  -0.0001  -0.0001 0 0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002 
30.04.2004 G -0.057*** -0.0001  0.0001 0.0009***  0.0006**  0.0002 0.0008*** 
17.06.2004 S -0.057***  0.0004  -0.0001 -0.0008*** -0.0011***  0.0004  0.0001 
16.09.2004 S  -0.011  -0.0001  0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
16.12.2004 S -0.067***  0.0001  0.0001  0.0005**  0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
17.03.2005 S  -0.024  0.0001  0.0001  0.0007***  -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 
29.04.2005 G  0.013  -0.0003  0.0001 -0.0007*** 0.0003  0.0002  0.0001 
16.06.2005 S  0  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0003 -0.0008***  -0.0007*** 0.0001 
15.09.2005 S -0.026***  0  -0.0019***  0.0009*** 0.0014***  -0.0001  -0.0019*** 
15.12.2005 S  -0.01  0.0001 -0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0032***  0.0001  -0.0004 
All announcements                      
Anova F-stat  572***  0.13  42.55*** 20.71*** 15.01***  0.38  2.11 
Med. Chi-sq.  3.15**  0.8  7.03*** 15.05*** 7.12***  3.51*  1.16 
Var. F-test    3829***  1.67*  21.05***  10.01***  16.2***  2.54***  5.33*** 
Scheduled only                      
Anova F-stat  141***  0.70  57.22*** 14.23*** 15.51***  0.39  2.97* 
Med. Chi-sq.  2.77*  0.33  5.56** 9.77***  7.12***  3.51*  1.16 
Var. F-test     601***  1.27  24.89*** 11.72***  16.2***  2.54***  5.33*** 
No unscheduled, no general meetings                
Anova F-stat  158***  1.84  68.02***  22.64***  11.13***  11.1***  9.59*** 
Med. Chi-sq.  2.6*  2.05  2.06 12.69***  6.95***  2.02  0.33 
Var. F-test     854***  1.71  30.1***  10.86*** 11.24*** 24.04***  6.5*** 
 
* S means scheduled monetary policy decisions; U means unscheduled monetary policy decisions; G stands for General 
Meeting. 
   41
Table 5.2: Swiss bond market reactions to official speeches 
 
Panel A: within trading hours        
date 
30 min 
before  30 min after 
from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
since 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
03.04.2000 0 0.0004**  0.0004  0.0001  0.0025*** -0.0016  -0.0006  0.002 
12.07.2000 0 -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0019** 0.0016  0  -0.001 
25.08.2000 0  0.0008***  0.0002  0.0002  0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 0.0007 
16.01.2001 0  0  0 -0.0001  -0.0027**  -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0016 
09.05.2001 0.0005** -0.0001  0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 
07.09.2001  -0.0005**  0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 0.0016 0.0006 
14.09.2001  0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0023*** -0.0004  0.0013  0 
17.09.2001 0.0004*  0  0  0.0001 0.0002 0.0013 0.0007 0.0008 
26.02.2002 0.0001  0  -0.0002 0.0006* -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0006  -0.001 
04.09.2002 -0.0006***  0.0001  0.0005*  -0.0001 0.0033*** 0.0021  0.0015  0.0028** 
23.09.2002 0.0001  0  0.0001 -0.0002 0.0016* -0.0003  0.0006  0.0008 
04.11.2002 -0.0005**  -0.0004**  0.0001  0.0001 -0.0012 0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0002 
11.02.2003 -0.0009***  0  -0.0004  0.0005*  0.0011 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0014 
21.05.2003 -0.0009***  0  -0.0004  0.0005* 0.0011 -0.0008 0.0005 -0.0005 
05.06.2003
a -0.0009***  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0004 0.0011 0.0015  0.0025*  -0.0002 
26.06.2003 0.0001  -0.0004**  0.0001  0.0004 0.0011 0.0015  -0.003**  0.0011 
19.08.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0001  0.0004  0.0011 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0011 
30.08.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0005* 0  0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0008  -0.0049*** 
08.10.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0005*  -0.0005*  0.001 0.001  -0.0004  0.0001 
27.10.2003 0 -0.0004*  0.0004  -0.0001 0.001  0  -0.0018  -0.0011 
05.12.2003 -0.0006*** -0.0002  0.0001 0  0.0022**  0.0006  0.0024*  0.0024* 
29.01.2004
a -0.0006***  0  0  -0.0001  -0.0024*** 0.0008 -0.0035*** 0.0005 
08.03.2004 -0.0001  0.0002  -0.0001  0.001*** 0.0022** 0.0033** 0.0028**  0 
23.04.2004  0.0001  0 0 0  -0.0042*** -0.0002  -0.0009  -0.0016 
07.05.2004 0.0003 0.0005** 0.0003  0 -0.001  -0.0025*  -0.0031**  -0.0013 
04.06.2004 -0.0007***  0.0003  0  -0.0001  -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0004 
18.11.2004 -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.0007**  0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0018  0 
23.11.2004 -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0026*** 0.0017  0.001  0.0012 
06.12.2004  0  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0023** 0.0005  0.0021  0.001 
11.01.2005 -0.001*** 0.001***  0.0002  -0.0001 0.0007 0.0005  0  -0.0004 
02.02.2005 0.0001  0.0001  0.0005  0.0001 0.0019** 0.0018  0.0004  -0.0003 
04.02.2005 0.0009*** -0.0001  0.0003  0.0019*** 0.0042***  -0.0003  0.0024*  0.0008 
04.03.2005 0.0003 0.0005**  0  0.0007** 0.006***  0.0023*  0.002  0 
07.03.2005 0.0002  0.0002  0  0  0.0034*** 0.002  0.0008  0.0007 
21.04.2005 0 -0.0002  0.0005  -0.0001 0.0039*** -0.0009  -0.0002  0.0001 
27.05.2005 0.0001  0.0009***  -0.0003  0  0.0013 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 
14.06.2005 -0.0001 -0.0001  0.0001 0.0007** -0.0027***  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0034** 
29.08.2005 0.0001 0.0004**  0  -0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 
02.11.2005 -0.0023***  -0.0008***  0.0001  -0.0025*** 0.0023**  -0.0007  -0.0029**  -0.0013 
29.11.2005 0.0001  0.0012***  0.0004  -0.0006** 0.0036***  -0.0005  0.0011  0.0006 
07.12.2005 0.0012*** -0.0003  0.0003  0.0006** 0.0015 0.0031** -0.0008  0.0017 
          
%  signif. 23%  23% 6% 17%  30% 6% 12% 6% 
Anova F-stat  9.98***  3.13*  3.37* 1.49  22.15***  1.1  0.38  0.05 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.4  0.28  4.22**  0.36 11.03*** 0.18  2.85*  0.18 
Var.  F-test  4.44*** 2.33***  1.3  2.06*** 2.46***  1.03  1.01  1.06   42
 
Panel B: off market    
date day  before  same day  day after 
07.04.2000 -0.0006  0.0007 0.0031** 
30.09.2002 0.0005 0.0026**  -0.0004 
05.12.2002 0.0001  0.0009 0.0026* 
17.03.2003 -0.0032**  -0.0032**  -0.0069*** 
26.03.2003 -0.0011 -0.0020  0.0035*** 
31.03.2003 0.0009  0.0041***  0.0008 
06.05.2003 0.0003  0.0009  0.0037*** 
12.06.2003 0.0009 -0.0022*  -0.0011 
16.06.2003
b -0.0011  0.0004 -0.0031** 
01.09.2003 -0.0002 -0.0008  -0.0049*** 
02.10.2003 0.0006 -0.0025*  -0.0024* 
09.03.2005 0.0007  0  -0.0038*** 
09.11.2005 0.0005  0  -0.0027** 
      
% signif.  1%  6%  13% 
Anova F-stat  0.48  2.75*  3.41* 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.41  2.18  1.91 
Var. F-test  1.82***  1.05  1.65*** 
 
a Overlapping events: this speech was preceded by an interview. 
b Overlapping events: this speech was preceded by another speech.   43
Table 5.3: Swiss bond market reaction to interviews 
 






from 30 to 
60 min 
from 1 h to 
2 h 
within 24 
hours  day before  same day  day after 
12.01.2000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003  0  0.0023** -0.001  -0.0001  0.0004 
03.08.2000 -0.0003  0  0  -0.0005*  -0.0016* 0.0005  -0.0003 -0.0001 
25.08.2000
a 0  0.0008***  0.0002  0.0002  0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 0.0007 
31.08.2000 0.0001 0.0003*  -0.0001  -0.0015*** -0.0019**  -0.0002  -0.0003  0.0014 
30.04.2001 -0.0002  -0.0004**  -0.0004  -0.0005* -0.0015  -0.0002  -0.0016  0 
10.05.2001 0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0015  0.0005  0  0.0006 
03.01.2002 0.0001 0.0004*  0.001*** 0.0003  0.0036***  0  0.0016  0.0008 
27.03.2002 0.0001 0.0002  0  0.0001  0.0019**  0.0008 0.0022* 0.0017 
14.05.2002 -0.0001  0  0  0.0005* 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0017  -0.0001 
23.07.2002
b 0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  -0.0001 0.002** 0.0022  0.0004 0.0034* 
25.07.2002 -0.0003 0.0001  0.0004 -0.0005* 0.0001 0.0034**  -0.0014  0.0003 
02.09.2002 0.0001 0.0004*  -0.0001 0.0003 0.002** 0.0005  0.0011  0.0021 
12.09.2002 0.0008***  0.0011*** 0.0001  -0.0003 0.0026*** -0.0005  0.0024* 0.0032** 
05.12.2002 -0.0009***  0  -0.0003  0.0003 0.0009 0.0001 0.0009  0.0026* 
27.01.2003 -0.0009***  0  -0.0004  0.0004 0.0009 0.0017 0.0005  0 
28.01.2003 -0.0009***  0  -0.0004  0.0004 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0007 0.0005 
24.02.2003 -0.0009***  0  -0.0004  0.0004 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0009 0.0003 
02.04.2003 0.0001  0  -0.0004  0.0005* 0.0011 0.0008  -0.0024*  -0.0037*** 
07.04.2003 0  0 -0.0004  0.0005*  0.0011 -0.0005  -0.0044***  0.0007 
18.06.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0001  0.0004  0.0011 -0.0031**  -0.0054***  -0.0039*** 
15.08.2003
a 0  -0.0004**  0.0001  0.0004  0.0011 -0.0031** 0.0007  0.0005 
21.08.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0005 0 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0016  -0.0006 
01.10.2003 0  -0.0004**  0.0005  -0.0005 0.001  0.0033**  0.0006  -0.0025* 
22.10.2003 0  -0.0004*  0.0004  -0.0001 0.001 0.0009 0.0014 0.0006 
29.01.2004 0.0001  -0.0009***  -0.0001  -0.0006**  -0.0043*** 0.0008 -0.0035*** 0.0005 
23.11.2004
b 0.0001  0.0001  0.0005*  0.0007**  0.0029*** 0.0017  0.001  0.0012 
17.01.2005 -0.0002 0.0001  0.0003 0.0005* 0.0018** -0.0008  0.0013  0 
28.01.2005  -0.0001 0.0017*** -0.0003 0  0.0025***  -0.0005  0.001  0.0007 
08.04.2005 0  0 0.0001  0.0001  0.0019** 0.0017  -0.0013  0.0018 
20.04.2005 -0.0004* 0.0001  0.0002 0.0009*** 0.0005  0.001  -0.0009  -0.0002 
07.09.2005 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0002 
          
%  signif. 11%  24% 6% 24%  24% 7% 11% 9% 
Anova F-stat  3.24*  0.02  0.20  0.14 6.95*** 1.18  0.65  1.45 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.1  0.38  1.33 5.53**  9.30***  2.8*  0.11 6.37** 
Var.  F-test  1.27 1.95*** 1.19  1.15  1.24  1.1  1.37  1.30 
   44
 
Panel B: off market    
date day  before  same day  day after 
08.04.2000 0.0007  -  0.0031** 
09.01.2001 0.0005  -0.0022*  -0.0003 
28.01.2002 -0.0017  -0.0027**  0.0000 
02.05.2002 0.0000 0.0000  0.0035*** 
02.05.2002
a 0.0000 0.0000  0.0035*** 
04.09.2002 0.0021 0.0015  0.0028** 
29.09.2002 0.0005  -  0.0026** 
12.03.2003 0.0002  -0.0011  -0.0036*** 
15.03.2003  -0.0032** - -0.0032** 
18.03.2003 -0.0032**  -0.0069***  -0.0052*** 
26.03.2003 -0.0011  -0.0020  0.0035*** 
16.06.2003 -0.0011 0.0004  -0.0031** 
02.10.2003 0.0006  -0.0025*  -0.0024* 
07.11.2003 -0.0017  -0.0022*  0.0005 
26.10.2005 -0.003**  -0.0033**  -0.0004 
     
%  signif.  2% 7% 9% 
Anova  F-stat  0.48 2.75* 0.13 
Med. Chi-sq.  0.66  2.18*  0.41 
Varian. F-test  1.82***  1.05  1.23 
 
a Overlapping events: this interview was preceded by another interview. 
b Overlapping events: this interview was preceded by a speech.   45
Table 5.4 Effects of central bank communication 
  
Foreign 
exchange       
  α  β  R
2  Variance Ratio 
Announcements -0.06  -0.67  0.02  8.72 
Prob ttest  0.41  0.07    0.00 
Speeches -0.01  0.77  0.00 0.28 
Prob ttest  0.75  0.63    0.78 
Interviews -0.02  -1.48  0.07  1.88 
Prob ttest  0.42  0.09    0.06 
        
Equity market       
  α  β  R
2 Variance  Ratio 
Announcements -0.03  -0.98  0.14  0.66 
Prob ttest  0.49  0.03    0.52 
Speeches -0.01  -0.33  0.00 0.54 
Prob ttest  0.81  0.90    0.59 
Interviews 0.00  -2.54  0.04  0.78 
Prob ttest  0.93  0.23    0.44 
        
Bond market       
  α  β  R
2 Variance  Ratio 
Announcements 0.00  -0.44  0.18  3.86 
Prob ttest  0.90  0.09    0.00 
Speeches 0.00  -0.70  0.06 1.14 
Prob ttest  0.73  0.06    0.26 
Interviews 0.00  -0.40  0.07  1.30 
Prob ttest  0.53  0.10    0.20 
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